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ABSTRACT
The key notion in service-oriented architecture is decoupling
clients and providers of a service based on an abstract service de-
scription, which is used by the service broker to point clients to
a suitable service implementation. A client then sends service re-
quests directly to the service implementation. A problem with the
current architecture is that it does not provide trustworthy means
for clients to specify, service brokers to verify, and service imple-
mentations to prove that certain desired non-functional properties
are satisfied during service request processing. An example of such
non-functional property is access and persistence restrictions on the
data received as part of the service requests. In this work, we pro-
pose an extension of the service-oriented architecture that provides
these facilities. We also discuss a prototype implementation of this
architecture and report preliminary results that demonstrate the po-
tential practical value of the proposed architecture in real-world
software applications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification -
Assertion checkers; D.2.11 [Software Engineering]: Software Ar-
chitectures - Domain Specific Architectures
General Terms
Measurement, Security, Verification
Keywords
Service Oriented Architecture, trust, client-side data privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Service-oriented architectures (or service-oriented computing
paradigm) promote abstraction, loose coupling and interoperability
of clients and services [5, 10, 11]. The key idea is introduce a pub-
lished interface (often in the form of a description written in web
services definition language (WSDL [4]) , which acts as a basis for
communication between three type of entities : service implemen-
tation (or providers), service mediation (or brokers), and service
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consumption (or clients). The communication follows the sequence
publish-find-bind-execute to discover and use services [5, 10, 11].
The published interface describes the functional requirements for
co-ordination between service implementations and clients. Every
service implementation must satisfy its functional requirements.
For example, a published interface for a location-based hotel find-
ing service may expect clients to provide a GPS co-ordinate in a
specified format and expect the service implementation to produce
the address of the nearest hotel as a string to that GPS co-ordinate.
The specification of input (GPS co-ordinate) and output (the hotel’s
address) describe the functional requirements for this service.
Until recently specifying and verifying functional and non-
functional requirements have not received much attention. Most re-
cently some approaches are proposed to verify construction of web-
services such as that by Kuo et al. [7], which helps verify whether
a given message exchange is legal. On the other end of the spec-
trum are approaches to validate the functional and non-functional
requirements of a running service-oriented architecture such as by
Baresi et al. [3], Barbon et al. [2], Mahbub and Spanoudakis [8],
which aim to ensure— using dynamic monitoring— that a service-
oriented architecture is satisfying its requirements. The domain of
this work is the later set of approaches.
In service-oriented architectures, services are often executed on
machines that not owned or operated by users. To monitor a ser-
vice for functional requirements, such as “R1: the response given
by the location-based hotel finding service shall be the closest ho-
tel to the GPS co-ordinate specified by the client”, it is sufficient
to observe or test the interface of the service. On the other hand,
to validate requirements such as “R2: the service shall not persist
the GPS co-ordinate supplied by the client”, it may not to be suf-
ficient to validate just the external interface. This validation may
only come from a monitor that is executing in the same domain as
the service implementation and that can validate, by observing the
running service implementation, that the requirements such as R2
are indeed satisfied. The design and development of such moni-
tors is a widely studied problem (e.g. see [6]). Nevertheless the
key question remains, in a (possibly) untrusted domain who guar-
antee’s the integrity of the monitor? In other words, who monitors
the monitor?
The goal of our approach is as follows: given a set of service
specification (S), a service implementation (I), a monitor that is
capable of detecting deviations in the execution of the service im-
plementation from its specification (M : SXI → {true, false})
running in a trusted environment, and a monitor that is similarly
capable, but may be running in an untrusted environment (M ′ :
SXI → {true, false}), how can we detect whetherM ≡M ′ ?
What we do not do: we are not proposing an approach for run-
time requirements monitoring, there are many other research papers
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on this topic e.g. [6]. We do not propose to monitor functional re-
quirements using our approach, they can very well be monitored by
observing (or testing ) the externally visible interface of the service.
To give the reader an idea of the problem with verifying a mon-
itor in an untrusted environment without a root of trust, let us for a
moment assume that such a validation mechanism V ′ : MXM ′ →
{true, false} exists. Now in order to answer this validation ques-
tion, there must be a part of V ′ running in the same untrusted en-
vironment that can observe M ′ to compare it with M . If not, V ′
will depends on the untrusted environment to observe M ′, which
in turn may mask the true responses ofM ′ with expected responses
forM thereby invalidating the premise that V ′ exists. On the other
hand, if some part of V ′, say δV ′ is running in the same untrusted
environment to observeM ′, we will need another monitor to verify
that the integrity of δV ′ is not compromised, which will need to be
verified again, ad infinitum. In summary, V ′ may not exist.
We propose to use a hardware-based mechanism as a root of trust
for such validation mechanism. Let us consider the example de-
scribed in the previous paragraph. In this example, if we could
be sure that there exist a δV ′ such that we do not need another
monitor to verify its integrity, δV ′ would make V ′ realizable. For-
tunately, recent research results have shown that realization of such
hardware-based root of trust is possible in the form of a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [15, 14]. TPMs is a co-processor that is
now being shipped with every CPU of major processor vendors
such as Intel and AMD and is therefore available broadly. In this
work, we describe an architecture based on TPM to validate the
integrity of a runtime requirement monitor, which will in turn fa-
cilitate trusted services.
Section 2 describes trusted platform modules, which form the
basis of our proposed architecture. Section 3 describes our pro-
posed architecture. The experimental evaluation of a prototype im-
plementation conforming to this architecture is discussed in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 compares and contrasts our work with the related
approaches. Section 6 discusses future work and concludes.
2. TRUSTED PLATFORMMODULE
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a trusted agent co-
processor within a remote computing platform which derives its
root of trust from its manufacturer or a delegated trusted third
party [17]. A TPM can be trusted to perform certain actions truth-
fully despite being an integral part of a potentially malicious or
compromised system. In other words, it is our trusted ambassador
in a friendly or hostile foreign territory. A TPM provides roots of
trust for storage, measurement, and reporting of measurement.
Every TPM has a unique number assigned to it by the manu-
facturer called the Endorsement Key. This key can be used by the
owner to anonymously confirm that the identity keys were gener-
ated by the TPM in his system. In essence, every computer has a
unique identity which cannot be repudiated. This can serve to be
a fool-proof identity for every user. There is also a facility for on-
chip public and private key pair generation using the inbuilt hard-
ware Random Number Generator. This make it possible for the
TPM to do encryption and decryption of data.
The TPM also has a set of registers called Platform Configura-
tion Registers which can be used to store the 160-bit hash values
obtained using the SHA1 hashing algorithm of the TPM. The hard-
ware ensures that the hash value of any PCR can be changed only
by encrypting the new data over previous hash value of the PCR.
In this way, PCRs can be used to indelibly record the history of the
machine since the last reboot. The PCRs are cleared off at the time
of every reboot.
Over the past few years, computer industry has come up with
many initiatives to guarantee security, integrity and confidential-
ity of data through innovative hardware-based Architectures. A
consortium of key industry players, Trusted Computing group
(TCG) [17], came up with the specifications for a TPM with such
a goal. The TCG vision was that this rudimentary TPM supported
trust can be bootstrapped into a higher level trust through some
software trust architecture or design principle. Another popular
initiative is the Next-Generation Secure Trusted Computing Base
(NGSCB) [9]. The hardware vendors are moving towards installing
TPM on every computer that ships.
3. APPROACH
Figure 1: Our Proposed Architecture
Our proposed architecture is shown in Figure 1. The key addi-
tions to the standard SOA is a new interface that we call trust nego-
tiation and verification interface. The purpose of this interface is to
provide an abstraction for the clients to negotiate desired integrity
levels and for brokers to verify that the service implementation is
indeed conforming to the desired service specification. The trust
negotiation and verification interface between the service broker
and the service provider also allows broker to communicate with
its trusted agent, the trusted platform module, and with service spe-
cific trust monitor in the service providers domain. The role of the
trusted platform module is to periodically validate the integrity of
the trust analyzer that in turn validates the conformance of the ser-
vice implementation with the service specification.
We have implemented a very simple system based on this hy-
pothesized architecture to show the feasibility of our approach. Our
system is shown in Figure 2. To recapitulate briefly, in a SOA there
are three main entities: the service provider, the service broker and
the client (customer). In the context of this paper, the words client,
customer and end user are used interchangeably. The client con-
tacts the service broker with a request and the broker directs the
requester to the service provider. In our example system, the ser-
vice broker also acts as the trusted third party. The monitor in this
case is very simple, it verifies whether the service implementation
on the service provider’s side is genuine. This monitor can be di-
rectly implemented using the trusted platform module’s primitives.
The trusted third party hosts an authentication server to authen-
ticate whether the service implementation on the service provider’s
side is genuine. It does so by verifying whether the implementation
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has changed since the last known deployment. For the purpose of
this simple system, we are assuming that if the service provider had
malicious intentions, the service implementation would be modi-
fied to either store or process the confidential customer data. It
may not always be necessary; however, but we are deferring dy-
namic monitoring for future work. The goal of this architecture is
to help the client to successfully complete the transaction with an
assurance from the trusted third party that the service provider has
not stored or processed the confidential data that were provided by
the customer.
The algorithm for verifying the integrity is as described below.
1. A clean-room copy of the service implementation is provided
by the service provider to the trusted third party.
2. The authentication server on the trusted third party takes in-
tegrity measurements by computing the 160-bit hash of im-
portant configuration files, source files and class files of the
web-service implementation in a specific order using the in-
built Sha1 hash engine of the TPM and stores it for future
reference.
3. The authentication server sends an ordered list of files to the
TPM on service provider’s side. The TPM computes the 160-
bit hash of these files in the given order and sends it across
to the authentication server.
4. When the authentication server receives the hash from the
TPM, it is compared with the reference value stored at the
time of clean-room measurement of the software.
5. Even if there is a slight difference in any of the measured
files, there will be significant variations in the calculated
SHA1 hash value from that file onwards. Wang et al. [20]
claims that it takes 269 units of time to find SHA1 collisions
implying that collisions are very rare.
6. If the hash value received is different from the reference hash
value, the service broker which is also the trusted third party
can notify the customer of a possible violation.
The measurements made by the trust analyzer on the service
provider’s side are stored in a specific PCR of the TPM. The con-
tents of this PCR is encrypted using the public part of the Attes-
tation Identity Key (AIK) of the trusted third party’s TPM before
sending data to it. AIK is a special purpose asymmetric signature
key created by the TPM manufacturer, the private portion of which
is non-migratable and protected by the TPM. Thus, whatever data
is received from the trust analyzer is trustworthy. The TPM of the
trusted third party decrypts the PCR data using the private part of
the AIK. This ensures that the hash value sent to the authentication
server cannot be tampered by the service provider.
When the SOAP server restarts or a patch is applied to the soft-
ware, the above steps are repeated when one the following happens
on the service provider’s side because it might result in a change
of the hash value stored in the PCR, even if there are no violations.
For small files the inbuilt hash engine in the TPM can be used to
compute the hash value. Whereas, for large pieces of data, it is
advantageous to use a hash engine outside the TPM, as the TPM
hardware may be too slow in performance for such purposes. This
is the main reason for measuring only parts of the software that
deal with the handling of confidential data and the files that deal
with the critical system configuration.
Figure 2: An Implementation of the Proposed Architecture
Figure 3: Example of Trust Violation by a Web Service
4. EVALUATION
This section describes an evaluation of our implementation for a
simple web service dealing with financial transactions. This web
service is described in the following subsection.
4.1 Example Web Service
Figure 3 depicts a common case of violation of trust by web ser-
vices involved in financial transactions. The web service takes the
credit card number, the card validation code (cvc) and the purchase
order as input from the customer. At the end of the transaction,
the customer gets back the invoice number, which is the output of
the web service. In this example, the customer is unaware of the
fact that the web service provider has processed the customer’s in-
put for adversarial purposes and that it has stored his credit card
number in a local database. The web service may have been cer-
tified as compliant at the time of deployment, but later, it might
have been reprogrammed by the service provider with a malicious
intent. This violation of trust goes undetected. In essence, without
much ado, the web service provider has extracted the customer’s
credit card number and other sensitive data. Currently, there are no
established strategies for detecting such violations of trust.
4.2 Experimental Setup
The architecture was implemented using two Dell Precision 390
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stations each having Intel Core2 Duo Processor @ 1.86 GHz and
2 GB of RAM. Both the stations have a TPM (Version 1.2) man-
ufactured by Atmel Corporation, embedded in them. The Atmel
TPMs in these stations have 24 PCRs each. One of the stations
is assigned the role of a service provider while the other plays
the role of a trusted third party. We used the tpm4java [18] for
developing our trust analyzer to measure the implementation on
the service provider. The Java library tpm4java, developed at TU-
Darmstadt, Germany, is used for accessing the TPM functionality
from Java applications. The test environment consists of Apache
Web server Version 2.2, Tomcat Servlet Container Version 5.5.23
and Axis SOAP server Version 2-1.1.1 running on Windows XP
Professional operating system.
4.3 Experiment
For evaluating this architecture, we created the web-service that
carries out an online transaction for a customer as described in Sec-
tion 4.1. This web service is invoked from a web browser. The
customer gives the credit card number and the card validation code
along with the list of items to be purchased. On the implementation
side, we have two filesOrder.java and Process.java that contain the
code for carrying out this transaction and for giving back an invoice
number as the output. There are two versions of these files. The
first version is exactly according to the web service specification.
Whereas, the second version is very similar to the first one except
that it has been altered to store the credit card numbers locally.
Table 1: TPM Measurements for a Genuine and a Malicious
Service (Details Elided)
File 160-bit SHA1
Hash of Gen-
uine Program
160-bit SHA1
of the Modi-
fied Program
../EchoHeaders.jws 34F6....32B7 34F6....32B7
...
../Order.java F354....14A3 3D12....FCCB
...
../httpd.conf C9FD....4AA7 4FFF....B99F
...
../mime.types 7996....4748 17A4....8059
The first column of the Table 1 lists the names of the files in the
web-service implementation. The second column in the Table 1
shows the 160-bit hash values of PCR #10 during clean-room mea-
surements of the software. The third column shows those measure-
ments that were obtained after the source-code had been altered.
It can easily be observed that the hash values in the third column
starting from the entry corresponding to the file Order.java are all
different from their corresponding entries in the second column.
This is because the SHA1 hashing algorithm in the TPM not only
hashes the contents of the candidate files but also preserves the or-
der in which the files were hashed. This implies that at least one
file includingOrder.java has been altered without the knowledge of
the trusted third party. The list of files that were monitored, which
includes log files, class files and executables, is long and only a
subset of this list is published in this paper to demonstrate the via-
bility of the concept. Thus, our architecture can detect a violation
of trust in a web service implementation and can produce evidence
for the same. A web service deployed in such a setting can claim
to be "trust preserving".
5. RELATEDWORK
Ever since the 1970s, efforts have been made to produce secure
operating systems [16] as a basis for secure computing. Any sys-
tem can be thought of as consisting of many layers of abstractions.
The integrity of a system is built recursively through a chain of
integrity checks starting from the lowermost level of abstraction.
Each level is checked for integrity before passing the control to the
next higher level. In 1997, Arabaugh et al. proposed an architecture
for secure and reliable bootstrapping called AEGIS [1]. In AEGIS,
the integrity checks begin from the power-on and continue till the
control is handed over to the operating system. AEGIS modifies
the boot process so that all executable code is verified using digi-
tal signatures prior to its execution. Here, the chain of trust begins
from the software loaded in BIOS and PROM boards. AEGIS also
incorporates the capability to recover from integrity failures using
replacement modules. Thus, it can guarantee that the system initial-
izes to a secure state. Microsoft has incorporated a feature called
secure startup in the Longhorn version of Windows [9]. Secure
startup has the capability to ensure that the PC running Longhorn
starts in a known good-state. AEGIS cannot distinguish fake hard-
ware from the genuine one. If the booting process is not sequential,
certain non-trivial changes have to be made to the architecture.
In 2003, Grafinkel et al. proposed Terra, a virtual-machine based
platform for Trusted Computing. Terra allowed multiple applica-
tions with diverse security requirements to run simultaneously on
the same hardware. A virtual machine monitor was used to simul-
taneously partition the hardware into independent, isolated virtual
machines. The software stack of each virtual machine could be
tailored to meet the security requirements of the software running
on that virtual machine. Terra can give digital certificates for all
of the software running on the virtual machines, to the third party
for verification. However, it is not possible to selectively measure
individual software. The ever increasing number of device drivers
pose a formidable challenge to implement the virtual machine mon-
itor. Terra does not address the issue of loading untrusted drivers.
Unlike AEGIS, Terra does not start from a secure boot process.
There are many ways and means to enforce policies such as con-
fidentiality and security on the end-to-end behavior of a computing
system. Such methods are broadly classified as Information Flow
Mechanisms. Other than carrying out a rigorous analysis on the
system as a whole to prove that it enforces the specified security
policies, Information Flow Mechanisms also take into considera-
tion the possibility of supplying malicious inputs to the program
so that it terminates abnormally. Then, it is verified if confidential
information can be extracted from the exception trace. Sablefeld
et al. address such issues through language-based techniques for
specification and enforcement of security policies in [13]. The lim-
itation of this approach is that the security policies can only be
specified by the programmer. The user of the software has no say
in it. Identifying such short-comings, Vachharajani et al. proposed
RIFLE [19], a user-centric run-time information flow architecture.
Information flow systems such as this allow untrusted applications
to access confidential data but prevents the data from getting leaked
to other programs or covert channels. The authors claim that RI-
FLE can be used to enforce user-defined security policies on any
program through a security-enhanced operating system. Such an
architecture is useful if the user wants to be certain that the program
running on his/her machine is not propagating any confidential lo-
cal data, that the user is unaware of. It is difficult to apply this tech-
nique without major changes in the context of a Service Oriented
Architecture because the web service implementation program runs
elsewhere rather than locally.
In 2004, Sailer et al. proposed a TCG based Integrity Measure-
ment Architecture for Linux [15]. This architecture made use of
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to store the integrity
measurements of the system using the SHA1 Hash function module
of the TPM hardware. Unlike AEGIS, this system only takes mea-
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surements and does not have a recovery process. Also, this system
can take selective measurements of the software to create a repre-
sentative evidence that can be interpreted by the remote party. The
purpose of this architecture is to present an ordered list of mea-
surements to a remote party. The remote system determines the
integrity of the attested system by reconstructing the image of the
attested system’s software stack on the local system using these
measurements and then by applying the security policy on the lo-
cal software stack. To establish mutual trust, this process has to be
carried out on both sides involved in the transaction [14]. This was
implemented by instrumenting the Linux kernel to create measure-
ments and to store them in the TPM hardware to protect against
compromised systems. This architecture takes measurements of
the kernel modules, executables and shared libraries, configuration
files and other important files before they are loaded on the system.
The advantage of this architecture is that it could verify integrity of
a system up to it’s application layer (web server).
However, the process of mutual attestation is quite complex in-
volving recreating the image of the other party on the local system
based on the measurements obtained and then applying a security
policy to it. The task of taking measurements is implemented by
making modifications to the Linux kernel code. In case of online
transactions, common users may not have the Linux operating sys-
tem. In a majority of the cases, the two communicating parties may
not have the same operating system in their environments. This
makes it difficult to recreate the image locally based on the mea-
surements sent out by the other party. Our architecture is designed
to address these issues.
Another related approach is Aglet [12]. An aglet is a java ob-
ject with a code component and a data component. The key idea
here is to use these mobile agents to preserve privacy. An aglet
consists of two distinct parts: the aglet core and the aglet proxy.
The aglet core contains all the internal variables and methods. It
provides interfaces through which the environment can make use
of the aglet or vice versa. The core is encapsulated with an aglet
proxy which acts as a shield against any attempt to directly access
the private variables and methods of the aglet. This aglet proxy can
be programmed to enforce local privacy requirements on the site of
the remote entity. Aglets are deployed into aglet servers, which en-
forces the requirement of the security model. A key problem with
aglets is that the integrity of aglets depends on the integrity of aglet
servers, which cannot be guaranteed in an untrusted environment.
However, our architecture can be used to ensure the integrity of
the aglet server, which would then provide a basis of integrity for
aglets.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
A service-oriented architecture is only as secure as its weakest
link. In a truly decoupled environment, which is the main motto of
SOAs, including constructs to negotiate, enforce, and verify trust
and security guarantees within the provider’s application domain
through the service discovery interfaces thus seems to be a crucial
pre-condition of mission-critical deployment of SOAs. Our pro-
posed architecture for ensuring the integrity of requirement moni-
tors is a step in this direction. Our current experimental results have
looked at static checksum as a method of ensuring the integrity of
the monitor. In future, besides conducting an extensive evaluation
of the overheads associated with this mechanism, we will also look
into dynamic mechanisms.
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